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Andrew Kania 
Music and art 
It is unsurprising that there are chapters on literature, painting and music in this 
volume - if they're not arts, nothing is. It is almost as predictable that there are 
chapters devoted to topics such as depiction and metaphor. The issues raised by 
depiction and metaphor are central to the artistic use of pictures and language, yet 
these topics do not pertain exclusively to art (there are lots of pictures that are not 
artworks, such as maps, diagrams and holiday snaps; people use metaphors in all 
sorts of contexts). Should it be surprising that there is no such counterpart chapter 
for music? In short, can there be music that is not art? 
Most philosophers who have discussed music seem to have assumed that all 
music is artistic; at least they have ignored nonartistic music. For instance, Jerrold 
Levinson argues that music is "sounds temporally organized by a person for the pur­
pose of enriching or intensifying experience through active engagement (e.g. listening, 
dancing, performing) with the sounds regarded primarily, or in significant measure, 
as sounds" (1990a: 273). This is an "aesthetic" definition of music insofar as it 
requires the musician to aim at eliciting a certain kind of heightened experience in 
the audience. If you think, however, that a lullaby sung to put a baby to sleep is an 
example of music, then it is a counterexample to this definition, since the singer 
intends precisely the opposite of active engagement on the baby's part. Levinson 
considers the example of muzak, claiming that his definition rightly excludes it 
(1990a: 274). But it seems plausible that muzak is music - albeit bad music - and thus 
that a definition that allows for nonartistic music, such as lullabies and muzak, 
would be preferable to one that doesn't. 
Roger Scruton suggests that what makes a sound music is that it "exists within a 
musical 'field of force"' (1997: 17). For instance, when you knock your wine glass 
against another during a toast, the sound it emits will have a certain frequency, per­
haps a frequency that corresponds to one of the keys on a piano. But the sound 
does not thereby have a pitch (e.g. middle C) because it is not heard as such. So if a 
glass further down the table emits the frequency corresponding to a G, you will not 
wait for the harmonic tension to be resolved by the appearance of another C, as you 
would if you were listening to a bass line. By putting it this way, Scruton makes 
being music a subjective matter - if you do hear the sounds of these wine glasses as 
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introducing harmonic tension, they are thereby musical notes. When we turn to 
central examples of music, however, this subjectivism has unfortunate consequences. 
If you do not hear the sounds produced by a musical group from an unfamiliar 
culture as music, they are thereby not music - at least for you. It would accord 
better with our conception of music (and human creation in general) to make the 
musical status of sounds depend on the actions of those producing them, rather than 
the attitudes of those listening. 
I have thus suggested an intentionalist definition along Scrutonian lines, according 
to which music is "(l) any event intentionally produced or organized (2) to be heard, 
and (3) either (a) to have some basic musical feature, such as pitch or rhythm, or (b) to 
be listened to for such features" (Kania 2011: 12). Because this definition appeals to 
"basic musical features," it allows for the distinction, argued for by Andy Hamilton 
(2007: 40-65), between music and (nonmusical) sound art. (By contrast, Levinson 
must count "sound art" as music, since it meets all the conditions of his definition.) 
But the disjunctive third condition allows for a further distinction between "indis­
cernible" works of music and sound art. Suppose Yoko Ono and John Cage inde­
pendently took copies of the same recording of a toilet flushing and presented them 
as works of art. It would seem a significant difference if Ono intended you to listen 
to the sounds for features such as pitch and rhythm (even though these expectations 
would be frustrated), while Cage intended you to listen to them as the pure sounds 
they are in themselves. This definition captures the difference, classifying Ono's 
work as music but not Cage's, even though they sound the same. 
To return to the issue we opened with, since a lullaby has pitches and rhythms, 
and is intended to be heard, it counts as music according to this definition. But is it 
art? On the present account, this is a separate question, presumably to be decided by a 
general theory of art, rather than a musical theory in particular. For instance, those 
with inclinations towards an aesthetic theory of art might argue that the lullaby is art 
in virtue of its beauty, while institutionalists may argue that the singer in this case 
does not possess the instituqonal authority in the art-music world to transform this 
music into art. (See "Definitions of art," Chapter 21 of this volume.) Whatever theory 
of art is proposed, though, it is likely that some music will be excluded, such as musical 
exercises (scales, arpeggios and so on), doorbells and simple ringtones. The features 
that make these things music are what could be addressed in a chapter on music in the 
art-neutral sense, just as the chapters on pictorial representation and metaphor in this 
volume have application to nonartistic uses of pictures and language. 
The value of music 
Music, like anything, can be valuable for all sorts of instrumental reasons: Lullabies 
are useful for putting recalcitrant babies to sleep, ringtones let us know when 
someone is calling us and so on. But many have thought there is something more 
intrinsically valuable about much music, especially musical works of art (understood 
to include performances, recordings, etc.). The idea is that while any soporific lullaby 
might do to put the baby to sleep, whatever it is that we value in our favorite piece 
of music is essentially tied up with an experience of its individual features, making it 
640 
MUSIC 
irreplaceable as a means to that experience. In the remainder of this chapter, I consider 
two aspects of music that philosophers have argued are centrally valuable: its 
emotional expressivity and its formal features. 
Consider a song, such as Radiohead's "We Suck Young Blood," from Hail to the 
Thief (2003). If you think it is a good song, what is it about it that makes this so? (For 
all the questions and answers that follow, there are obvious counterparts if you 
think the song is bad or mediocre.) Part of the answer may be that the lyrics are 
powerful, whether you interpret them to be about aging stars in the music industry, 
intergenerational relations in general, or factory farming. But, as with most songs, 
the lyrics seem rather thin when read by themselves. Clearly, the musical compo­
nents of the song contribute greatly to what makes it good. (If I wrote a song with 
the same lyrics, it would not be nearly as good.) For instance, the glacial tempo, the 
insistently chromatic piano accompaniment and the languidly scattered handclaps 
reinforce the gloominess of the lyrics. But how can purely musical features such as 
these imbue the sounds with an emotional quality such as gloominess? This question, 
of how music can express emotions, is perhaps the one on which most ink has been 
spilled in contemporary philosophy of music. 
Emotional expressittity 
It might be tempting at first to think that the gloominess of the music is easily 
explained by the gloominess of the lyrics. But this can't be the whole story. After 
all, setting the same lyrics to the music of the Beatles's "Can't Buy Me Love" would 
not make that music gloomy. Rather, the music suits the lyrics precisely because it 
is, antecedently, emotionally expressive. However, it may be that the music does not 
by itself express gloominess exactly. Perhaps in itself the music is languid, dark and off­
kilter, and the lyrics sharpen this feeling to one of gloominess in particular. We 
might say similar things about music's ability to represent things other than emo­
tions. It is plausible that the music of an instrumental work such as Smetana's 
"Moldau" represents (or perhaps simply exemplifies) a general structure of small 
elements in motion coming together to form one large movement. Smetana's 
"program" may be enough to make this a matter of representing several tributaries 
leading to a great river (the piece is one of a cycle of works entitled Ma Vlast (My 
Country); its particular subject is the Czech river). But the same music could be 
successfully used in a film, say, to represent a multitude of people joining in a 
pilgrimage. 
What explains the music's antecedent expressive properties - those it possesses 
before the addition of (or in the absence of) lyrics or a program? One answer that 
remains persistently appealing, despite its rejection by most philosophers, is the 
theory of expressionism: the emotional properties of the music are those felt by 
the musicians (the composer and/or performer), expressed through the music. One 
objection to this view is analogous to the one given above. Just as music is antecedently 
more or less appropriate for combination with a given text, it is antecedently more or 
less appropriate for the expression of some felt emotion. This suggests that the 
expressivity of the music is independent of its use as an expression of an actually felt 
emotion and explains how people can fail to express what they intend to in their 
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compositions and performances. A related objection is that it seems possible for 
people to create highly expressive music without having experienced the emotions it 
expresses. None of this shows that people cannot express their emotions by produ­
cing music, but it leaves the central puzzle unsolved: how is it that music can be 
expressive in the absence of literal expression? 
Another enduringly popular but philosophically problematic solution is arousal­
ism, according to which music has the emotional properties it does in virtue of 
arousing those emotions in listeners. The two main objections to the view are both 
claims that it gets things the wrong way around. First, when music does arouse a 
certain emotion in a listener, it seems usually to be because the music is expressive. But 
this would mean that the expressivity would be logically prior to the arousal, and 
hence couldn't be constituted by it. (This point raises two further problems for the 
theory. First, some people seem not to be emotionally moved by music at all, even 
when they recognize that it is emotionally expressive. Second, the emotion aroused 
by the music need not be the emotion it expresses. For example, the gloominess of 
"We Suck Young Blood" may elicit homn- in you, rather than making you feel 
gloomy yourself.) The second main objection to the arousal theory is that by locat­
ing the emotion in the listener it fails to explain the emotion in the music. As Derek 
Matravers puts it, "hearing music as sad is not equivalent to hearing music and 
feeling sad ... [Moreover,] the feeling ends up in the wrong place: not in the music, 
but in the head of the listener" (2011: 218; Matravers goes on to consider two recent 
limited, but more sophisticated, arousalist theories). 
Perhaps the most popular view among philosophers recently has been that a 
musical passage expresses an emotion in virtue of resembling some aspect of the 
emotion as ordinarily experienced by people. Susanne Langer's early version of this 
view suggests that music resembles the phenomenology, or inner feeling, of emo­
tional states (Langer 1953). One problem with this view is that the phenomenological 
components of emotions seem too thin to ground the particularity of expression 
many find in music. For instance, rage and joy may share a kind of upwards-rushing 
feeling; thus, if the music resembles only that feeling, it will be at best ambiguous. 
(Langer embraced the conclusion that music cannot express particular emotions.) 
Most resemblance theorists have instead argued that music resembles not just the 
phenomenology of a given emotion, but its typical vocal, facial or behavioral 
expressions (e.g. Kivy 1989; Davies 1994). Thus, the music of "We Suck Young 
Blood" is gloomy because it resembles the typical behavior of a gloomy person, even 
though no one is actually expressing their gloominess through the song, just as a 
basset hound's face is sad because it resembles the typical facial expression of a sad 
person, even though the dog is not actually expressing its emotional state through its 
physiognomy. 
One objection to resemblance theories is that they do not get to the heart of 
expressivity. The fact that a musical passage resembles something does not thereby 
imply that it expresses that thing. If a musical passage and a basset hound's face both 
resemble a sad person, then the musical passage resembles the basset hound's face 
(and vice versa); the fact that the musical passage doesn't express or represent a 
basset hound shows that there must be more to expressivity than resemblance. Jerrold 
Levinson (2006) argues that the missing factor is that the musical passage typically 
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causes us to imagine that its contours are an actual expression of emotion by a 
person (but does not typically cause us to imagine that they are the contours of a 
dog's face). Stephen Davies (2006) resists this addition because he thinks, first, that it 
is implausible that listeners necessarily or even typically imagine that there is some 
person in or behind the music, expressing themselves through it and, second, that 
you do not need to posit such a response in order to respond to the objection. In 
fact, resemblance theorists have always given some sort of dispositional account of 
our responses to music. They argue that, for some psychological reason, we are 
simply disposed to hear musical passages as expressive of emotions, and not as 
representing dogs' faces. This does not require imagining that anyone is literally 
expressing themselves, any more than believing the temperature has risen requires 
imagining that something has literally moved upwards in space. 
There is one other way that most philosophers agree music can express emotions, 
namely by convention. For instance, in Western music the minor mode has come to 
express darker emotional states. Exactly how and when this came about and the 
extent to which it is still the case are complicated musicological questions, but it is 
relatively uncontroversial that it is a convention based in part in a slow accretion of 
cultural associations between the minor mode and an unsettled feeling. The lack of 
controversy is due to two facts. First, there is no obvious significant difference 
between the resemblance to ordinary emotional expression of the contours of a 
minor triad or melody and the closest major triad or melody, yet they clearly differ 
in their expressivity. Second, musical systems are culturally contingent. Being an 
expert practitioner or theorist in one culture's music is of little to no use in assessing 
the expressivity of the music of an unfamiliar culture. It is difficult to determine how 
much musical expressivity is due to convention and how much to some other kind 
of reason; it could be that philosophers have focused on the latter kinds of expla­
nation not because they account for the lion's share of expressivity but because they 
are more philosophically interesting. 
Some have argued that, however music expresses emotions, this expressivity 
cannot be enough to explain music's value. For one thing, the mere fact that music is 
expressive is not obviously a reason to value it. Emoticons express emotions, but we 
do not consider them valuable works of art. Of course, it is plausible that we value 
musical expressions of emotion because they are more richly detailed than emoticons. 
But still, why value an expression of emotion at all, especially if it is not an emotion 
anyone is actually experiencing? One answer might be that we just do value accurate, 
detailed representations of things. The value we accord to music's expression of emo­
tion is in this respect no more puzzling than that we accord to the lifelike narrative of a 
novel or the realism of a lobster in an oil painting (Kivy 1989: 112-31). Another might be 
that in appreciating expressive music, we do not simply observe the emotions expressed, 
but ourselves experience those emotions, or others, in response. Perhaps this experi­
ence is cathartic, purging us of somehow unhealthy emotions. Or perhaps it helps us 
understand our emotional states or capacities, or is simply pleasurable in itself 
(Levinson 1990b). (In the case of "negative" emotions, such as gloominess, we might 
obviously prefer to have such experiences in the absence of their usual causes.) 
Against all this it may be argued that other art forms are superior to music 
in expressing emotional states, and thus that these explanations fail to account for a 
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significant portion of music's value (Goldman 1992: 35-37; Budd 1995: 155-57). It is 
plausible that there are some emotional states that music is powerless to express, for 
instance those with complex intentional structures, such as envy. And, of course, 
representational arts are much better at presenting us with emotions in fully realized 
contexts, which might suggest these arts are superior to music in, say, helping us to 
understand our emotional states and capacities. However, it is not obvious that 
other arts' superiority in representing or expressing emotions implies that they are 
superior in eliciting the emotional responses that lead to such benefits. 
Musical form 
However these disputes are resolved, some have argued that music's emotional 
expressivity cannot account for its great value. They point to the fact that there are 
extremely valuable works of music (such as many of Bach's fugues) that are not 
particularly expressive, and that, in general, the differences in value between pieces 
of music can hardly be accounted for in terms of differences in their expressivity. 
These theorists argue that it is formal features of musical works that account for the 
greatest part of their value (Budd 1995; Goldman 1992; Kivy 1990, 2009). The formal 
features of a piece of music are traditionally understood as those that have to do 
with the relationships of various parts of the piece to one another. So, we recognize 
that we are encountering the second verse of a song when the same musical material 
returns accompanying different words, and that we are encountering a return of the 
chorus when other music and lyrics are repeated together. Since the nineteenth 
century, much of the study of Western classical music has been devoted to formal 
theory and analysis. 
The promise of formalism as an account of music's value should be obvious 
to those familiar with canonical works of Western classical instrumental music. 
(I shall call such music, without accompanying words, program, film and so on, 
"pure" music.) This is music that seems to have a syntax but no semantics. That is, 
just as with ordinary language, we can tell whether or not a given musical event is 
a suitable continuation of a previous passage (a matter of syntax). For instance, in 
the key of C major, moving from a D-minor chord to a Cmajor chord would be a 
"syntactical" error akin to writing a "sentence" without a verb (e.g. "The quick 
brown fox the lazy dog"). In C major, a D-minor chord "needs to" move to the tonic 
(C major) via the dominant (G major) - it is a "pre-dominant" chord - just as that 
sentence obviously needs a verb. But unlike ordinary language, the elements of 
musical language do not mean anything (a matter of semantics). Our faulty 
sentence is clearly about two animals, even if we're not sure how they're related, but 
neither the Cmajor nor D-minor chords seem to refer to anything beyond 
themselves. 
Formalism is the theory that accords value to syntax, thus it seems custom-made 
for instrumental music (whereas it faces obvious problems when it comes to repre­
sentational arts such as painting and literature). A great work of music, according to 
this theory, is one that creates certain expectations in the ears of listeners by begin­
ning a formal structure in a certain way, and then goes on to satisfy and frustrate 
those expectations in a complex manner by means of the continuation of the formal 
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structure in such a way that the listener is not driven away by too much frustration, 
yet is intrigued enough by the remaining expectations to keep listening until they are 
ultimately satisfied (Kivy 1990: 68-145). 
This is the barest characterization of musical formalism, yet it is enough to raise 
some difficult questions for the formalist. First, even if formalism can be developed 
into a compelling theory of the value of instrumental Western classical music, this is 
but a small fraction of the world's (or even the West's) music. So it might be 
objected that this theory has only narrow application and is thus of little interest. 
One reply the formalist can give is that pure music is an interestingly difficult case 
for a theory of musical value. We may not think immediately of formalism when 
asked to explain the value of songs, film music, dance music and so on. Yet it may 
explain why we would not give up songs even with all the poetry in the world, or 
why a musical representation of a river cannot be replaced without loss by a film, 
painting or literary description of it. For perhaps formalism can explain the value 
contributed to these "impure" works by their purely musical aspects. And if this is 
granted, we can see the utility of thinking primarily about purely instrumental 
music when discussing the value of all music - pure or otherwise: instrumental music 
isolates musical features, enabling us to think more clearly about what they are and 
how they work, just as isolating chemical elements in a laboratory enables us to 
understand more easily what goes on in the messiness of the world outside the lab. 
A second question is how formalism is supposed to explain the high value we 
place on purely instrumental musical works. That is, the formalist has pointed to 
complex features possessed by such works, but, as we saw with respect to emotional 
expressivity, one might still ask what reason we have to think such features are 
valuable. The formalist might give the same initial response: we just do value formal 
complexity, and if there is a further explanation to be given of this fact, it is psy­
chological rather than philosophical (Kivy 2009: 205-13). Moreover, we especially 
value formal complexity skillfully produced by human beings, and thus displaying 
their (and thereby, in general, our) cognitive capacities (Davies 2002). (This kind of 
response could be applied to many sources of musical value, such as emotional 
expressivity, virtuosity and so on.) 
This answer will be insufficient if it turns out there are artifacts as formally complex 
as the greatest purely musical works, yet which we do not value as highly. Candi­
dates are bound to be controversial, but we might consider (actual or hypothetical) 
abstract visual artworks, such as arabesques or tapa cloths, and mathematical 
proofs - even chess moves (Davies 2002). Peter Kivy suggests that (again, for reasons 
beyond the scope of philosophy) hearing may be the faculty "most amenable to 
being pleased and intrigued by pure formal structure, in the absence of representa­
tional or semantic content" (2002: 263). Malcolm Budd points to the ability of music 
(as opposed to, say, mathematical proofs) to say something about formal features 
themselves, as when a movement seems to be a critique of, say, sonata form (Budd 
1995: 164-71). 
More philosophically profound justifications of formalism have been given which 
have roots in the work of Arthur Schopenhauer (Schopenhauer 2010: bk III). These 
theories turn the problem of the abstract nature of instrumental music on its head, 
arguing that music is valuable not despite but precisely because of its lack of relation 
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to the "real world." The idea is that in appreciating pure music we gain entry into a 
world where there is tension and struggle, but where this can be resolved in a com­
pletely satisfying way (unlike the typical case in the real world). Moreover, we enjoy 
the cognitive challenge of understanding the music's formal complexity, and while 
engrossed in the music we are temporarily lifted out of our everyday troubles 
(Goldman 1992; Kivy 1997: 179-217). 
It may be that no one has ever been a "narrow formalist," denying the relevance 
of even such basic musical content as melodies, harmonies and rhythms - the ele­
ments that formal relationships hold between (Hamilton 2007: 87-89). But even 
"broad formalism," which acknowledges the musical importance of these elements, 
has recently been challenged by philosophers and musicologists in a number of 
ways. For instance, recent formalists have argued that the emotional content of a 
purely musical work can contribute to its formal structure (Kivy 2002: 88-101). 
More attention has also been paid to timbre, the least formal of basic musical features, 
especially in light of the expanded timbral possibilities of music constructed in the 
recording studio, such as (some have argued) rock or contemporary popular music 
(Gracyk 1996; Zak 2001). 
A more radical challenge to traditional formalism is Jerrold Levinson's "con­
catenationism" (1997). Levinson argues that large-scale formal features, of the sort 
represented in a formal diagram (which have been the focus of most musicological 
theory and analysis) are much less important to understanding a piece of music than the 
relationships that hold between contiguous musical events, which can be simulta· 
neously apprehended in the "mind's ear" in the moment. Ultimately, Levinson can 
be interpreted as offering an alternative formalist theory, albeit one that, like con­
temporary architectonic theories such as Kivy's, accords an important role to the 
emotional content of pure music. The fact that this attack on architectonicism might 
be taken as an attack on formalism shows how deeply traditional formalism itself is 
rooted in the assumptions Levinson questions. 
Other issues 
Like most philosophers of music, I have focused here on philosophical problems 
raised by thinking about purely instrumental music, or the purely musical aspects of 
other works. That is because these are arguably the most puzzling philosophical 
problems music raises. But the theories proposed as solutions to these problems 
have application beyond purely instrumental music. For to the extent that vocal, 
sacred or dance music, for instance, are musical, the same problems will arise, and 
the same kinds of solutions will likely suggest themselves. 
There are also philosophical questions not touched on here regarding many 
aspects of music. There is a large literature on the ontology of musical works (the 
kinds of things they are and their relationships to performances and recordings). 
Some of this literature is on rather general, abstract issues (e.g. Dodd 2007). while 
some is very closely tied to particular musical traditions (e.g. Davies 2001). there are 
also many descriptive and normative issues concerning performance and recording, 
such as the nature and value of virtuosity, improvisation, authenticity and hearing 
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live performances vs. recordings. (For introductions to these issues, see respectively 
Mark 1980; Brown 2011; "Authenticity in performance," Chapter 44 of this volume; 
and Kania and Gracyk 2011.) There is no consensus on the nature of fundamental 
musical understanding, such as what it is to hear a melody as rising - moving 
through some kind of musical space (Scruton 1983; Budd 1985; Davies 2011). And 
there is growing interest in the relation of the philosophy of music to other di� 
ciplines that study music. Moreover, there is a rich history of answers to many of 
these questions stretching back to the ancient world. For introductions to these and 
other issues (which still only scratch the surface), see Gracyk and Kania (2011). 
See also Idealism (Chapter 7), Nietzsche (Chapter 8), Formalism (Chapter 9), Expressi­
vism (Chapter 11), Goodman (Chapter 18), Definitions of art (Chapter 21), Ontology of 
art (Chapter 23), The aesthetic (Chapter 24), Value of art (Chapter 28), Art, 
expression and emotion (Chapter 39), Authenticity in performance (Chapter 44), 
High art versus low art (Chapter 46). 
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